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16 April 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Intelligence as a Force Multiplier--Meeting with [] 25X1
 [] Chief, Military Operational Support Division, DIA, 25X1
 14 April 1986

1. I met with [] in his office at the Pentagon. [] 25X1
 arranged the meeting but was unable to attend. [] showed no special interest 25X1
 in the force multiplier concept or its study, but was very enthusiastic about
 describing his division's ongoing activities that include NMIST, TENCAP, and
 support to the executive staff of the JCS.

2. [] said that NMIST, the National Military Intelligence Support 25X1
 Terminal,* is an effort to link assets of the national intelligence community
 to field users almost exclusively for "crisis" operations (at distinct from
 the more intensive "combat/war," or the well-planned small-scale "raid"). The
 idea is to put in the field with the "crisis-deployed" J-2 "a national
 advisory team" that formats and conveys local intelligence requirements by
 priority to the NFIB agencies (CIA, DIA, and NSA) and staffs the responses.
 The team decides which agency can provide the best and fastest response. The
 DIRNSA recently rebuffed a proposal [] that the NSA's Cryptologic Support 25X1
 Group (that operates the new [] 25X1
 [] be combined with the NMIST team. Both the NMIST and NSA's Cryptologic 25X1
 Support Group are responses to certain intelligence-related findings of the
 Long Commission, i.e., that the Marines in Lebanon couldn't process and
 assimilate the large volume of intelligence that they were receiving even
 though there were "shortfalls" in communications for the flow of intelligence.

3. For NMIST to work well, a satellite-relay communications link
 dedicated to intelligence is needed. Under present conditions important
 intelligence messages would have to compete with operational and all other
 messages carrying the highest precedence resulting in inevitable delays in
 getting intelligence to the J-2. This issue is now being worked by the C³
 systems people on the JCS staff. A positive outcome is expected in a year or
 so despite the limited number of available satellite communications channels.

[] said that the "T" in NMIST would better stand for "team." 25X1

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4. [] said that his division was part of DIA's Directorate for External Relations which also is responsible conducting DIA's liaison with congress and the OSD staff, and for supporting negotiations. He said that NMIST would rely on two principle DIA "nodes" for the substantive support needed by the deployed J-2: the National Military Intelligence Center and the Intelligence Task Force (ITF). The latter is the most important node because it is constituted only in a crisis and has tasking and coordinating authority within DIA. For example, it can task the Research Crisis Support Center that is part of DIA's research directorate. The NMIST deployment concept involves a total of nine staffers--4 at the ITF, 2 at the relevant U&S command, and 3 with the deployed J-2. These relationships were tested in a recent month-long exercise in Honduras. In its wake, General Perroots last week announced that NMIST will be pursued vigorously and that everyone in DIA is to support the effort. NMIST originally was funded in TIARA but is now part of the GDIP. It is not a GDIP line item for FY86 or FY87 and, according to the D/DIA, will be "taken out of DIA's hide" if necessary.

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Support Division, DIA, 14 April 1986

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